The prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 requires that the misrepresentation, concealment, or concealment be “knowingly and intentionally,” meaning that “the testimony must have been given with intent to deceive, an intent to induce or mislead belief in falsehood, but Section 1001 does not require intent to deceive — that is, the intent to hide something from someone by deceiving them.” United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1276-77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980). The government can prove that a false statement was made “knowingly and intentionally” by proving that the defendants acted intentionally and knowing that the statement was false. See United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1990). The jury could conclude from a plan of elaborate lies and half-truths that the defendants intentionally provided the government with information they knew to be false. Id., pp. 214-15. (d) If the definition of a crime does not prescribe a guilty state of mind, a culpable state of mind is nevertheless required, unless the definition clearly waives any mental element.
(i) A person acts “knowingly” or “knowingly” of the nature of his conduct or of the circumstances surrounding his conduct if he has knowledge of the nature of his conduct or of the existence of the circumstances. A person acts “knowingly” or “knowingly” with respect to a result of his or her behaviour if that person knows that the person`s behaviour is reasonably certain that it will cause the result. All crimes defined in this Code where the requirement of intellectual culpability is expressed as “knowingly”, “known” or “knowingly” are offences of general intent. (g) Where the definition of an offence prescribes a guilty state of mind in respect of one or more particular elements of that offence, the prescribed guilty state of mind is required only for certain elements and a guilty state of mind is not required for any other element of the offence, unless otherwise provided. (f) Where the definition of an offence prescribes a state of mind sufficient to commit an offence without distinction between the material elements of the offence, this provision applies to all material elements of the offence, unless a contrary aim is obvious. According to the provisions of the Model Penal Code, a person is deemed to have knowingly acted in relation to an essential element of a criminal offence if: if that element is related to the nature of his conduct or the circumstances associated with it, he knows that the conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; If the item refers to a result of the person`s behavior, they are aware of the fact that it is essentially certain that the behavior will trigger such an outcome. (e) If the definition of an offence does not prescribe a culpable state of mind but is nevertheless required by subparagraph (d), the expression “intent”, “knowledge” or “recklessness” is sufficient to establish criminal responsibility. SCIEMEMENT, pleadings. The word “knowingly” or “knowingly” gives rise to a positive statement in an indictment or a statement that the defendant knew the facts presented later; If the notification or knowledge is mentioned unnecessarily, the application may be rejected as surplus. Empty com. dig.
Indictment, G 6; 2 Stra. 904; 2 East, 452; 1 puppy. Pl. *367; Scientific vacuum. When the term is knowingly used in an indictment, it means that the accused knew what he was going to do and, subject to that knowledge, was involved in the act of which he was charged. 21-5202. Guilty state of mind; Definition of intentional, conscious, reckless. (a) Unless otherwise provided, culpable state of mind is an essential element of any offence defined in this Code. A guilty state of mind can be established by proving that the accused`s conduct was committed “intentionally”, “knowingly” or “recklessly”.
As used in the legislation, the term “knowingly” simply requires that the accused have acted with the knowledge of falsehood. See United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1287-89 (5th cir. 1976). As in other situations, committing an act “knowingly” means doing so knowingly or knowingly or knowingly, and not because of a mistake, accident or any other innocent reason. See Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, § 1.35 (1990). Knowledge of the penal code, which regulates conduct, is not required. The misrepresentation does not need to be made fraudulently if the intent is to mislead or promote belief in one`s lie.
Reckless disregard for whether a statement is true or a conscious attempt not to learn the truth can be interpreted as “conscious” action. United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244, 246 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. rejected, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978). (c) Proof of a fault greater than that alleged shall be deemed to be proof of the fault alleged. If carelessness is sufficient to establish an element, this element is also detected when a person acts knowingly or intentionally. If acting knowingly is sufficient to establish an element, that element is also detected when a person acts intentionally.
(j) A person acts “recklessly” or is “reckless” if he or she deliberately disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances will exist or that an outcome will follow, and that such non-compliance constitutes a flagrant departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would apply in the situation. (h) A person acts “intentionally” or “intentionally” with respect to the nature of his or her conduct or any result of his or her conduct if his or her purpose or conscious desire is to engage in or cause the result of the conduct. All offences defined in this Code for which the requirement of intellectual culpability is expressed as “intentional” or “intentional” are specific intentional offences. A criminal offence may provide that any other requirement of guilt is a specific intent. The term “intentional” means nothing more than the fact that the prohibited act was committed intentionally and knowingly, and does not require proof of malicious intent. McClanahan v. United States, 230 F.2d 919, 924 (5th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956); McBride v. United States, 225 F.2d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 934 (1956). An act is committed “intentionally” when it is done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something that the law prohibits. It is not necessary for the government to show bad intent on the part of a defendant to prove that the act was committed “deliberately.” See generally United States v.
Gregg, 612 F.2d 43, 50-51 (2d cir. 1979); American Surety Company v. Sullivan, 7 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1925)(Hand, J.); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971) (including 15 U.S.C.
§ 32(a)). See also 1 E. Devitt, C. Blackmar, M. Wolff & K. O`Malley, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, § 17.05 (1992). Supported by Black`s Law Dictionary, Free 2nd ed., and The Law Dictionary. Conscious; intentionally; subject to a full understanding of the facts or circumstances.
With knowledge; conscious; intelligent. The use of this word in an indictment is tantamount to asserting that the accused knew what he was going to do and that he committed the accused`s act knowingly. U. S. v. Claypool (D. C.) 14 Fed. 128.
(b) Guilty states of mind are classified according to relative degrees, from the highest to the lowest degree, as follows: A defendant is not exempt from the consequences of material misrepresentation through ignorance if the means to establish veracity are available. In appropriate circumstances, the government can prove that the defendant knew of the lie by proving that the defendant knew the statement was false or acted with a deliberate purpose to avoid learning the truth. See United States v. West, 666 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1981); Lange, 528 F.2d to 1288; United States v. Clearfield, 358 F. Supp. 564, 574 (A.D.
Pa. 1973). Proving that the accused acted with reckless contempt or reckless indifference may therefore satisfy the knowledge requirement if the accused makes a material false statement and deliberately avoids learning the facts or intends to deceive the government. See United States v. Schaffer, 600 F.2d 1120, 1122 (5th Cir. 1979).