Now, I would not say for a moment that because this critique of legal reason contains contradictory elements, it is proof of its falsity. It is quite conceivable that the legal mind is so twisted and distorted that it can absorb errors of all kinds. But at least this situation suggests that some discrimination is essential in the discussion of legal reason. I will try to find the distinctions that I think are necessary. Bentham was so busy uncovering sinister and clandestine intentions behind the lawyer`s jargon that he never had time to question whether it had a legitimate use. Does the lawyer really need a particular vocabulary? The answer is clear when it comes to legal language, which merely duplicates ordinary language. For example, there is little reason for the lawyer to call a “single woman” a “sole woman” when the concept indicated by both terms is exactly the same. There is no denying that much of the legal language is of this kind. But at least we can say that there are improvements over the “good old days” when, to quote Bentham again, “the fate of the English was settled in French and in something called Latin.” 2 An early example of “right-wing mind” appears in John Bunyan, The Holy War, Made by Shaddai upon Diabolus, for the recovery of the metropolis of the world, or, Losing and Retaking the City of Mansoul (1682): I have not yet mentioned what is considered the most damaging accusation against legal reason. It is conservative. No one disputes that, least of all the lawyer. And this inclination of the legal spirit is easily explained.
It is in the very nature of the law. That the study of science, which aims to maintain order in society, tends towards conservatism is hardly a miracle. And, of course, as is so often pointed out, the lawyer`s personal associations, at least if he succeeds, are rather limited to the most conservative branches of society. It is quite understandable that he is influenced by these associations. The actual decision-making processes in the judge`s mind may be vague, unanalyzable, inarticulate. But he must find “objective” reasons for his judgment. Somewhere, somehow, he must find “reasons” – although in the flow of his real thought, he does not discover “reasons”, but assumptions, inarticulate beliefs, intuitions of justice. From these amorphous things, he must forge syllogisms.
Sometimes it has to be a hopeless business. But like the person who is suddenly placed in a position of physical danger, the judge develops hidden and unexpected abilities. Its ability to ratiocin is rarely unsuitable for the task. We can only express our hope and conviction that the author of the volume before us will be rewarded for his diligence and diligence by rapidly becoming the textbook for American law students. The selection of works is meticulous; the order to be consulted, indicating a legal mind which has carefully examined its object and has joyfully anticipated the difficulties of these studies; The course is reasonable in scope and interspersed with many remarks, rules and explanations adapted to dispel students` fears or doubts and cheer them up on the path of investigation. “The Legal Mind is a well-written, highly engaged and highly innovative contribution to legal research. It offers a new representation of legal cognition, based on the integration of cognitive science, legal theory and philosophy. Contemporary theories of mind provide a point of view for studying how different human faculties (intuition, insight, imagination, emotion, language, abstraction, theorization, logic) interact in legal cognition. Past and present approaches to legal argumentation and interpretation are critically re-evaluated and linked to the new approach developed in the book. Highly recommended for lawyers, legal theorists and law students interested in increasing awareness of what it means to know and apply the law. The lawyer is portrayed as the rationalizer par excellence, as the man who can find a reason for everything and everyone.